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In the first part of the paper, the field of agent-based modeling (ABM) is discussed focusing
on the role of generative theories, aiming at explaining phenomena by growing them. After
a brief analysis of the major strengths of the field some crucial weaknesses are analyzed.
In particular, the generative power of ABM is found to have been underexploited, as the
pressure for simple recipes has prevailed and shadowed the application of rich cognitive
models. In the second part of the paper, the renewal of interest for Computational
Social Science (CSS) is focused upon, and several of its variants, such as deductive,
generative, and complex CSS, are identified and described. In the concluding remarks,
an interdisciplinary variant, which takes after ABM, reconciling it with the quantitative one,
is proposed as a fundamental requirement for a new program of the CSS.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The two decades around the turn of the millennium have seen the
rapid advent, and perhaps the premature decline, of a paradig-
matic shift in science, represented by agent-based modeling
(ABM) and simulation. In this section, after shortly defining what
we mean with ABM, we present a short account of its history.
1.1. WHAT AGENT-BASED MODELING IS
What is meant by Agent Based Modeling? Often, this is defined
in opposition to Equation-Based Modeling (see for example
Dyke Parunak et al., 1998; Cecconi et al., 2010). More specifically,
ABM arises at the intersection between agent theory, systems,
and architectures, on one hand, and the social sciences, on the
other hand. Agents are usually defined (see Conte, 2009) as
autonomous systems that operate transitions between states of
the world, based on mechanisms and representations somehow
incorporated into them.
Under this general definition, the field of agents shows a
tremendous variability. Agents vary indeed on several dimen-
sions, which include whether and to what extent they are
autonomous, self-interested, sociable, and capable to learn from
experience and/or observation. Agents also differ in their level
of complexity: according to a classic distinction introduced by
Wooldridge and Jennings in their influential work (Wooldridge
and Jennings, 1995), agents in a “strong” sense are capable to
manipulate and reason upon mental representations; otherwise
they are considered agents in a “weak” sense. Another impor-
tant distinction concerns the way in whichmental representations
are incorporated: symbolic representations allow an agent to
mentally manipulate them in order to reason, plan, take deci-
sion, communicate. Sub-symbolic representations are unaware,
implicit, based for example on network-like configurations repre-
senting the structure of relationships among neurons in cerebral
areas, and not liable to purposive manipulation on the side of the
agent. Finally, agents vary according to the philosophical or meta-
theoretical view their description is based upon. One example is
the attempt tomodel agents on the basis of a personal utility func-
tion, on which much work on agents has been done over the past
30–40 years or so, and that has also been criticized as for its micro
plausibility (Antunes and Coelho, 2004).
The practice of ABM however did represent a substantial
under-exploitation of such wide spectrum of possibilities. De
facto, much of the agent models worked out and simulated are
totally ad-hoc, based on very simple local rules (Epstein, 2006),
more or less arbitrarily implemented on a program running on
a computer (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). When the program is
run, macroscopic effects of the local rules can be observed on the
screen, and then be stored, analyzed and possibly visualized in
search for emergent phenomena. We will return to the problem
of ad-hoc rules in section 2.3 below. Such a practice of model-
ing lends itself well to observe and experiment upon multi-agent
worlds or agent societies. These are meant to either reproduce
some real-world setting or phenomenon [a typical example is the
Anasazi culture simulation (Axtell et al., 2002)], or to build up
and observe would-be worlds (Casti, 1997). Such models allow
novel theories about abstract social phenomena to be formulated,
operationalized, and tested. Examples of this application of ABM
abound and are among the best cited works so far worked out in
this field.
1.2. AGENT-BASED MODELING IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Conference proceedings, dedicated to the new methodology
of ABM and its multiple applications within the social and
behavioral areas of science, started to appear in Europe since
the early nineties (Gilbert and Doran, 1994; Gilbert and
Conte, 1995; Conte et al., 1997). Agent-based models of social
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phenomena trace back to as early as 1971, when the famous
(Schelling, 1971) model of segregation was published in the
Journal of Mathematical Sociology. In 2002, the field obtained
a major institutional acknowledgment, when the proceedings
of a Sackler Colloqium of the National Academy of Sciences,
under the title “Adaptive Agents, Intelligence, and Emergent
Human Organization: Capturing Complexity through Agent-
Based Modeling,” held in October 2001, were published on PNAS
(Bonabeau, 2002). In that circumstance, ABM was proclaimed
as the leading field—we might say the flagship to use a trendy
tag - in the renewal of the social, behavioral, and complex-
ity science, which was expected to take place in the years to
come. Consecrated by the US scientific institutions, the field was
already intensely practiced also, if not primarily, in Europe, where
ABM had given rise to a new journal, the Journal of Artificial
Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS, founded in 1998), to the
first scientific association (ESSA, The European Social Simulation
Association, created in 2003), and was at the center of a vari-
ety of promotional activities. Soon enough its range of influence
extended beyond the two sides of the Atlantic, reaching out to
the Pacific area, and giving rise to the PAAA association. At the
same time, the NAACSOS association was founded in the US.
After some years of fruitful competition, the associations joined
in the first World Conference on Social Simulation held in Kyoto
in 2006.
At the end of the first decade, however, the ABM leader-
ship seems to be challenged if not decisively weakened by the
(re)appearance of a more sober, more encompassing, and less
innovative tag, that of Computational Social Science (CSS), of
which ABM is a component (see Bankes et al., 2002) for an early
insight), and which now candidates itself to replace ABM in the
same leading position for the next decade. Evidence of a change
of leadership and of a possible coming era for bare CSS, rather
than for themore inspiring Generative Social Science proposed by
Epstein in 2006, can easily be found in some position papers (e.g.,
Lazer et al., 2009; Cioffi-Revilla, 2010), books recently appeared
(Gilbert, 2010), a new regional association—the CSS Society of
the Americas, born on the ashes of the short-lived NAACSOS, and
the relative conference held in 2011—and, finally, the objectives
of the unsuccessful but groundbreaking EU FET flagship pilot
FuturIct (www.futurict.eu).
If history is instructive, the study of signaling is fun. In
the era of information overflow, distributed content produc-
tion, collaborative filtering, crowd sourcing, and so on, emblems
are decisive. Tags have a far-reaching but short life. Under the
tyranny of PageRank, contents compete in terms of lookups,
and these most certainly depend on familiarity, and possibly
also on tags appeal. Science makes no difference. It is some-
what surprising when a paradigm shift is signaled by a flat
combination of two traditional scientific areas: social sciences
and computational science. What is the meaning conveyed by
this signal? Does the new label correspond to a new paradigm
shift in the social and behavioral sciences, or does it sim-
ply meet a kind of marketing need for periodical renewal of
names?
This paper presents an attempt to weigh up the impact of ABM
and answer the question whether this field is undergoing or not a
real decline; whether or not his replacement was timely, necessary,
and effective. Next, some current variants of CSS will be com-
pared. Finally, some important requirements for achieving real
progresses in the computational study of social phenomena will
be identified and discussed.
2. AGENT-BASED MODELING: A BALANCE
Rather than a detailed survey of ABM (for a good example, see
Helbing and Balietti, 2011a) this paper presents an attempt to
draw a balance of this field, pointing to its main weaknesses and
strengths.
2.1. STRENGTH OF AGENT-BASED MODELING
One may wonder what ABM is good for and what are its major
strong points. The tricky questions as to when ABM is really
needed, whether agent-based models can or cannot be converted
into an analytical, equation-based model and to what extent this
can be done has been debated at length elsewhere (see for example
Epstein, 2006; Cecconi et al., 2010). Nonetheless, ABM remains
the only known approach apt to model and reproduce sets of
heterogeneous agents interacting and communicating in different
ways.
Of course, ABM can only provide a sufficient explanation of
the phenomenon of interest, not a necessary one. This feature,
which (Epstein, 2006) extensively clarifies and discusses, is also
known asmulti-realizability (Sawyer, 2005), and it is an outstand-
ing property of multilevel systems. Amacro-level phenomenon in
whatever domain social, natural, mental, etc. of reality, is multi-
realizable when it can be implemented in different ways on the
lower levels. Inevitably, ABM generates the higher-level effect by
following one of the possible generating paths. Even if as many
models as generating paths were actually implemented, it would
still be difficult, if not impossible, to assess which one among
them is effectively implemented in the real world. But, interest-
ingly, this is true also of the target phenomena: an organization
can perform its mission independently of the internal structure
(consider as an example a project-based structure against a func-
tional one). Social conformity is achieved through a variety of
internal mechanisms, e.g., imitation or norm compliance. It is still
unclear how disapproval works as a sanction, whether it affects
people’s decision-making because it activates an expected asso-
ciated material punishment, or violates the goal of a good (self)
esteem. Actually, multi-realizability is a property not only of ABM
but also of the real world. In this sense, multi-realizability dif-
fers from the more general issue of model underdetermination,
as it connects it directly with possible generative paths in reality,
an analogy that makes ABM particularly apt to study the equiva-
lence, or possible lack thereof, of structure andmechanisms inside
intermediate levels, in the sense of the examples above.
To implement sets of heterogeneous agents in interaction
brings about a series of second order advantages: agent societies
are (1) operational platforms where theories get converted into
falsifiable hypotheses; (2) experimental laboratories where theo-
ries get gradually and thoroughly controlled; (3)multilevel worlds
where the level of individual units, the agent, is clearly distinct
from the macro-level, the system level and unforeseen effects and
emergent properties of interaction can be observed.
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In short, ABM is an in nuce society, which unfolds and actu-
alizes when the model is implemented on a computer program
and this runs. In some cases, the effects observed in the com-
puter could not be predicted while modeling and implementing
the single units, the individual agents. Hence, the effects of such
behavioral units on the whole agent society or parts of it can
be observed and investigated. Otherwise stated, ABM allows the
interplay between different levels of a social system to be modeled
and observed. As shall be seen later, this important property of
real-world societies has been insufficiently exploited. The main
dynamic investigated by ABM is the way-up of the interaction
among the micro and the macro-level. The complementary pro-
cess, the way-down from the macro-level to the micro-level, has
been poorly explored. Closing the loop, however, may require
a high level of ABM complexity. Theory-driven, non-ad-hoc
models of phenomena generated by intelligent behavior may be
relatively difficult to calibrate (Heckbert et al., 2010). Difficulties
usually increase with the model’s level of scale and the number of
parameters. One may perceive a trade-off between vertical scal-
ing, i.e., agent complexity, and horizontal scaling, i.e., scenario
complexity. Such a trade-off is probably one of the keys for ABM
development and leads us straightforward to one of the weak
points in the field.
2.2. WEAKNESS OF AGENT-BASED MODELING
Some problems and difficulties in the field of ABM and simula-
tion have been perceived from within the scientific community
since long, while others have only recently come to our atten-
tion. Since the field’s early days, a serious concern of Agent Based
modelers and simulators is how to design large-scale agent-based
simulations. In its initial applications, agent-basedmodels did not
care much about the problem of scale, as they were applied to
observe the emergence of patterns from interaction at the micro-
scopic level in artificial scenarios sharing some crucial features of
the real-world, but not really aimed to reproduce its details. As
soon as the potential of agent-based models became apparent—
revealing a great occasion for observing andmanipulating in silico
models of target phenomena in order to acquire a better control,
and possibly to optimize intervention—upgrading their level of
scale of several orders of magnitude proved necessary. You cannot
optimize a system of traffic if you do not manipulate parameters
in populations of several millions of agents.
Under the pressure of complex systems science, which is gain-
ing ground in the study of social phenomena (Helbing and
Balietti, 2011b), agent-based simulation is increasingly expected
to meet a further, and connected, important requirement, i.e.,
to be fed by massive data in real-time. To answer the prob-
lems of scale and real-time simulation, a variety of ICT solutions
(parallel and supercomputing infrastructures) are being designed
and tested. To deal with this challenge, agent-based simula-
tions were bent to applications needs, such as policy modeling
and traffic optimization (Grether et al., 2010), distributed com-
munication over the Internet (Chen, 2009), electricity market
(Guerci et al., 2010), financial crisis (Sornette, 2003), epidemics
(Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001). This is not the forum
for discussing sophisticated technical solutions (but for a review
of techniques to that purpose, the reader might be referred to
Paolucci et al., 2013) to the problem of making ABM more apt
to the requirements of BigData science. We will instead touch
briefly on the question of model equivalence across disciplines
and applications.
2.2.1. Equivalence of models
Unlike laws of nature, Agent Based models of socio-economic
phenomena are countless and not always consistent (see Alfi et al.,
2009). Think of the various heuristics and rules of thumb applied
in defining microscopic rules for ABM. Most of them gener-
ate results at the macroscopic level, which are applied more or
less the same narratives or metaphors. Hence, cooperation in
Prisoner’s Dilemma is found to emerge from a set of heteroge-
neous strategies, from TIT-FOR-TAT (Axelrod, 1997) to strong
reciprocity (Boyd et al., 2003), from image-scoring (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998) to reputation-building (Pinyol et al., 2012), and
finally group selection (Di Tosto et al., 2007); social control is
found to emerge from ostracism (Xenitidou and Elsenbroich,
2010), but also from partner selection, and finally from gossip
(Giardini and Conte, 2012); norms emerge from punishment
(Galán and Izquierdo, 2005), which in turn is but a TIT-FOR-
TAT strategy, but can also emerge from conditioned preferences
(Bicchieri, 2006), and from habituation (Epstein, 2008). Is mod-
els’ equivalence a major shortcoming of the field, or something
social scientists can put up with? What does it depend upon? Is it
a necessary or a contingent feature of ABM?
We believe the variety of equivalent agent models in part
depends on a property inherent to multi-level systems as com-
plex social systems are. The property in question is the multi-
realizability that we have mentioned above. In part, we believe it
to be a consequence of the shaky foundations, the poor theoretical
justification at the basis of many agent models. This is not equal
to finding poorly realistic the model of agent often proposed by
current modelers, and asking to improve it toward psychological,
cognitive, or sociological plausibility - toward a seemingly human
agent. What is wrong, in our view, is the procedure for model
building and the role of behavioral rules. Let us examine both
points with some detail in the next two sections.
2.3. THE ABM RECIPE FOR MODEL BUILDING
A consensus seems to have emerged in ABM on a minimal-
ity procedure; that is, models are built by setting up the rules
that are minimally required to obtain the macroscopic effect to
be described. While minimality might sound obviously inspired
by the success of hard sciences, the substantial failure to apply
such a minimality procedure to social science is testified by cen-
turies of failed attempts, starting from what had been announced
as “Social Physics” in the seventeenth century (for an historical
perspective, see Ball, 2002). The reasons for consensus on mini-
mality might be better described with the tools of the sociology of
science than rooted in the search of theoretically sound and scien-
tific advances. Indeed, the ABM community, being still relatively
small, is subject to issues of disciplinary recognition, with the con-
sequent pressure to publish in a limited number of outlets; and it
might still be looking for the right dimension of the contribution -
the ideal paper size, as measured in effort invested and soundness
of results, could be very different from the “correct” paper size
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in terms of publication chances. This discrepancy causes a moti-
vational pressure toward minimal (and publishable) models, and
hampers research in the much more interesting issue, why mini-
mality seems to fail in the social sciences. We will get back to our
intuition on this matter in the conclusions.
Under the rule of minimality, model building is operated (1)
a posteriori, based on backward engineering from the effects
obtained to the generating rules; (2) ad-hoc, so that rules are
suggested by the specific results to be obtained; (3) in a rule-
oriented rather than agent-oriented approach: what is achieved
is a set of rules, rather than an agent view; (4) inspired by the
minimal-conditions logic: modeling consists of finding out a set
of microscopic rules minimally required to reproduce a given
phenomenon of interest. The minimal approach, thus, strongly
reduces the validity of ABMs on two separate accounts. On the
one hand, theory-based, agent models are implausible caricatures
of agent as prescribed by the rationality theory, with a touch
of psychological realism in the best possible case. On the other
hand, when agent models are not derived from any pre-existing
agent theory or vision, whether computational or not, but only
by the behavior they are expected to generate (Epstein, 2006),
agent models become arbitrary, poorly comparable, competent
in highly specific domains of knowledge and disarmingly inapt
in any other. It should not come as a surprise if, as a result, a myr-
iad of rather inconsistent agent-basedmodels have been produced
over the past 20–30 years or so. Is it possible to find an escape
between implausible models and arbitrary ones, or between
ad-hoc rules and useless ones? Options exist, but are poorly
exploited. Why?
2.3.1. From cognitive models. . .
One such option is represented by cognitive agent models, which
exist since the late nineties. Their wide range of influence is shown
by the popularity of BDI architectures (about 32,700 “BDI agents”
cites on Google Scholar retrieved on March, 18th 2013) within
and beyond the field of agent systems and theories. Simulation
of social phenomena with BDI based models also abound in the
literature (about 7060 “BDI social simulation” cites on Google
Scholar on March, 18th 2013), and usable platforms to imple-
ment them are under consolidation, from Jason (Bordini et al.,
2007) to Netlogo extensions (Sakellariou et al., 2008). However,
works with this approach receive attention mostly from the com-
puter science community, and are rarely published in main social
scientific journals.
Although the rich cognitive models tag appeared since the
early nineties (for a recent example see Dignum et al., 2010),
the amount of models inspired from it remains negligible. Sub-
symbolic systems and neural nets did not make much better.
Although neural nets and social simulation fare better, rela-
tive publications again do not appear in major social scien-
tific journals. Why are cognitive theories on agency, whether
symbolic or subsymbolic, so poorly applied in ABM? In part,
there are problems of inner validity and calibration. While
it is difficult to control the inner validity a complex agent-
based model (Cioffi-Revilla, 2002; Windrum et al., 2007), to
calibrate it and manipulate parameters values so to reflect a
real-world system is hard. To gather data on which the agent
model is based upon takes more time and more complex empir-
ical methodology. Therefore, the utility of a complex agent
model to simulate the real-world system (i.e., showing that
the model’s results match the real-world data) is questionable
(Crooks et al., 2008). Undoubtedly, these difficulties reduce the
interest of cognitively grounded models simulators, although
the latter’s foundations are much firmer than those of most of
the models used. The lesson one might draw is that, like it or
not, scientific developments are often due to practical utility
more than theoretical soundness. However, the little success of
cognitively grounded agent-based models is also due to other
factors.
First, unlike other theory-grounded agent models, for exam-
ple the rational models, cognitive models are not prescriptive.
Whereas the theory of rationality is a theory of action, cognitive
modeling provides theories of the agent. Hence, the rational agent
model fits only apparently better the objectives of ABM and sim-
ulation, but it does so only because it allows the modeler to get
rid of the tricky part of the modeling, that is, how agents form the
goals, the motivations, the preferences, that will be implied in the
decisions.
2.3.2. .. to generative models.
Secondly, cognitive modeling is a truly generative theory of
behavior, accounting for behavior in terms of the mechanisms
that are supposed to operate while producing it. A genera-
tive explanation of an observed social phenomenon consists of
describing it in terms of the external (environmental and social)
and internal (behavioral) mechanisms that generate them, rather
than by inferring causes from observed co-variations. This is a
vital property of explanation, which cannot easily be realized
otherwise.When describing agent behavior bymeans of other for-
malisms (logic-based or numeric), we describe behavior from the
outside, as perceived by an observer, but do not describe the way
it is generated. ABM explains behavior from within, in terms of
the mechanisms that are supposed to have generated it, that is,
the mechanisms that operate in the agent when s/he behaves one
way or another.
Of course, behavior can be explained otherwise. For example,
the flight of hawks is wonderfully explained by the mathemati-
cal property of logarithmic spiral, such that any tangent from the
center of the spiral yields an angle of the same width. Thanks to
this property, hawks can keep their preys always in their aim while
describing a spiral before pouncing on them. But this explana-
tion is not generative, in the sense that it does not tell us what
are the internal mechanisms allowing hawks to fly the way they
do. For sure, hawks do not fly based on an understanding of the
properties of logarithmic spiral. How can they show the corre-
sponding behavior? The often invoked evolutionary explanation
offers poor help: it accounts for behavior in terms of its reproduc-
tive advantage. As the spiral-like flight proved advantageous for
hawks, those who performed it were able to generate more off-
spring, while the others extinguished. No generative theory here:
it tells us not how hawks produce the behavior in question. We
could use the mathematical theory to describe their behavior, and
incorporate the mathematical explanation into a set of ad-hoc
behavioral rules for reproducing it. But neither the mathematical
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explanation, which describes internal causes, nor the set of ad-hoc
rules are generative.
Now, a fully generative explanation implies a more general the-
ory of how external causes, including fitness-enhancing effects,
get converted into internal reasons (what sometimes are called
proximate causes of behavior). Agent-based models are often
limited in focus, and not easily compatible with the temporal per-
spective and the theoretical requirements of a fully generative - in
the sense here intended - explanation. Do we always need a gen-
erative explanation? Not really, as ad-hoc rules sometimes are just
all that is needed to explain behavior. This is the case of entirely
programmed organisms, and it may even be the case of hawks, as
far as we know. Sometimes, instead, you need more. Suppose you
want a hawk to learn a new trick with respect to the approach
behavior. That is, you, or nature, in the form of new environ-
ment - perhaps, but we’re letting imagination run wild here, in
the form of a prey that develops a counterstrategy to the spiral.
Then, immediately how the flight is generated becomes impor-
tant: how much learned, how much hard wired, and where; in a
plastic neuronal connection, or in a fixed relative placement of
eye and bone? Suddenly, to reproduce their behavior you would
need more than a rigid set of rules; you need to know how it is
generated.
Cognitive modeling aims at finding the general mechanisms
yielding the wide spectrum of behaviors of relatively autonomous
systems. Of course, you don’t need such mechanisms to simply
reproduce behavior. The more specific the target behavior, the
lesser you need a cognitive agent-basedmodel. Since ABM is often
used to investigate fairly specific phenomena, either mathematical
model or a set of ad-hoc rule are preferred over cognitive model-
ing. But together with cognitive modeling, we also dispense away
with truly generative modeling.
2.4. WHY BOTHER WITH GENERATIVE EXPLANATION
One might say, who cares after all? Provided we can reproduce
behavior, observe it and make artificial experiments to opti-
mize it, why bother with theory-driven generative modeling?
There are several reasons. One is that a truly generative explana-
tion is needed to model complex social dynamics. For universal
admission, the dynamics of social entities and phenomena is at
least bidirectional if not multidirectional. Entities and proper-
ties emerge from the bottom up and retro-act on the systems
that have generated them. Current agent-based models instead
simulate only emergent properties, i.e., the way up of social
dynamics. To mention only a few examples, the ABM litera-
ture offers countless models of the emergence of segregation,
norms, reciprocity, altruism, cooperation, punishment, conven-
tions, institutions, coalitions, leadership, hierarchies, the modern
state. Studies of different types and levels of downward causa-
tion are much less frequent (to cite some exceptions, see Gilbert,
2002; Conte et al., 2013). However, how to change self- and other-
damaging behaviors (i.e., smoking, over-eating, etc.) was ranked
as the fourth most important among the top-ten hard problems
the social sciences will have to address in the near future (Giles,
2011).
Agents should not be taken for granted as they change under
different types and degrees of social influence. Entities at the
macroscopic level affect them and their behavior, and we must
understand how this can happen if we want to drive, enforce, or
prevent such an influence. This a line of research that presents
obvious ethical issues, but at the same time addresses themes so
important that social science cannot just leave them alone, or,
even worse, desert them to market solutions. For example, at least
in some fields, we badly need to know how to reduce or control
people’s overconfidence, for example in finance, where it so heav-
ily contributed to the last financial crisis (see Akerlof and Shiller,
2010), causing a disruption of global scale; how to change people’s
bad food habits, which are mainly responsible for highly diffuse
diseases as diabetes; how to make low compliant populations to
obey the norms, how to increase social trust, reduce hostility
toward out-groups, favor communitarian attitudes, and so on.
All of these questions might find useful answers based on reality
mining. Through Google or Yahoo we may trace people’s habits,
moods, investment decisions, political views, risk propensity and
attitudes toward culture, education and migration. Based on this
information, we may drive production, capital movements, busi-
ness strategies, political decisions, and international cooperation.
But we will not be able to suggest effective plans for modifying
such behaviors and the underlyingmental states, unless we under-
stand the mental dynamics and how this interacts with the social
dynamics, and model the cognitive mechanisms that respond to
external influence and rule behavioral change. In absence of such
theory and model, we will not get to the core of hard problems.
2.5. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
ABM is a powerful means for investigating the hinge between dif-
ferent domains of reality, including economy, environment, and
society: systems’ behavior at different levels of scale. It is necessary
to explain phenomena pertaining to any domain of reality that is
heavily dependent on the behavior of autonomously interactive
systems, as was convincingly argued by Epstein. More, ABM is
unique for allowing a generative approach to behavioral systems
in the sense here defined, and somewhat different from Epstein’s,
i.e., to describe phenomena in terms of the external and internal
mechanisms that produce them.
However, ABM seems to have fulfilled its mission only in part.
Its generative capacity has been deployed to a lesser extent than
could have been the case. The practice of ABMmissed the oppor-
tunity it provided: paradoxically, the same principle that led it
to a fast popularity, like the KISS principle—i.e., keep it simple,
stupid - introduced by Axelrod (1997), and moreover the proce-
dure to find the minimal required conditions to obtain a given
phenomenon, do now sentence ABM to a premature end. The
KISS principle still drives most of the simulation work: we have
performed a check on a whole year of JASSS, a journal that we
consider representative of the files. In 2013, JASSS published 49
papers, of which 38 could be classified as simulations (the rest is
composed mostly by theoretical papers). Of those, 30 could be
considered as following the KISS advice, which makes about the
80% of published papers.
If internal mechanisms are ad-hoc and arbitrary, why don’t
dispense away with them in favor of more powerful quantitative
modeling allowing the same phenomena to be accurately pre-
dicted? Why bother with agents, if one can apply computational
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tools to reality mining and platforms to large scale real-world
data-driven simulations, and aim at even higher orders of mag-
nitude, enabling us to forecast events at aggregate levels, such
as epidemics, climate change, and traffic jams? Couldn’t it be
the case that a mere quantitative use of computational tools be
enough to forecast financial crises, social instability, and even
human well-being?
It could be the case, indeed. However, centuries of failed
attempts (see the “Social Physics” case mentioned above) make
us doubtful. But what is maybe more important, by pursu-
ing this quantitative approach alone, science would have lost a
wonderful opportunity: to understand the micro-foundations of
phenomena at aggregate levels and how the latter (re)generate
them.
3. COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
Science, like history, is not a linear process. A decade ago, social,
and behavioral science dropped the disciplinary label (Conte,
2002) under the influence of an entirely new field, ABM. In the
last couple of years a CSS is being re-proposed. But CSS is being
practiced since a couple of decades if not earlier. What is new to
the current program?
Computational Social Science (from now on CSS) can be
meant in at least three different ways, the deductive, the genera-
tive, and the complex one; and it should be made clear which one
we are referring to. As these are conceptual, rather than empirical,
variants, there is no need to have each of themmatching a defined
historical example of CSS, since concrete examples are often a
mix. Let us characterize variants also with reference to existing
programs and try to forecast what their consequences might be.
3.1. THE DEDUCTIVE VARIANT
The second half of the last century is constellated of attempts to
apply the theory-building instruments of mathematics and the
theory-testing tools of computer science on one side, game the-
oretic, and logic-based computational models on the other, to
describe and explain social phenomena. The latter, in particu-
lar, attempted at deducing properties at the macro-level from
general assumptions at the micro-level. Expectations á la homo
economicus, allowed by the theoretical framework, turned out to
be wrong, what did not imply that the approach was incorrect,
only that it had been based on the wrong assumption, depend-
ing on the theoretical and sometimes ideological positions of the
authors. What was worse, these position were often left implicit.
The deductive variant consists of formulating the mathematical
equations that account for the phenomena to be explained. With
the support of observation and data gathering, parameters can be
assigned their correct values. Although the theoretical framework
is often much too simple, the general program scarcely inter-
disciplinary, and the ambition for social impact mainly based
on a rather prescriptive view of micro-level theory, deductive
CSS yielded a foundational, general, explanatory theory of social
systems. A lesson we should not forget.
3.2. THE GENERATIVE VARIANT
The decline of the rationality paradigm produced several conse-
quences. One of these was a stronger and more interdisciplinary
effort to ground computational models on explicit models of
the micro-foundations. This led to the advent of the gener-
ative variant of ABM, which derives its explanatory vocation
and micro-foundational framework from the deductive variant.
Unlike it, generative science aims at modeling operational micro-
scopic rules that generate macroscopic phenomena, rather than
formulating mathematical equations from which to deduce them.
The explanatory vocation is declined in a radically different way:
rather than describing a causal process from the outside, themod-
eler attempts to show the internal rules that initialize it and follow
the unfolding of it all the way up to the observed effects.
As argued in the preceding section, however, ABM fulfilled its
mission, provide generative theories, to a lesser extent than was
expected. If the deductive variant was found to theorize upon
fairly abstract phenomena and has often been criticized for its
poor predictive capacity, the generative variant did not prove any
better at prediction, partly due to problems of validation and
calibration.
3.3. THE COMPLEX VARIANT
Inductive computational science is certainly not new (Newell and
Simon, 1976). The necessity to combine mathematics and logic
with learning, probability, and induction is receiving a grow-
ing attention since the early nineties in several computational
disciplines such as knowledge representation, reasoning about
uncertainty, data mining, and machine learning. Nor is new the
use of computational instruments for quantitative social science:
it suffices to think of the wide application of statistics package
for social scientific research, and by the number of reposito-
ries and archives of social scientific data (for example, http://
www.data-archive.ac.uk/). However, techniques of data-mining
are exercising an even stronger influence on the social sciences.
The use of advanced computer technology by social scientists is
also shown by sites where freely available web resources are assem-
bled with information on how access social scientific data (see
for example, http://guides.lib.wayne.edu/socialsciencesdata), and
by funded programs for interfaces between computer and social
sciences.
A new impulse to computer-based quantitative social science
is coming from the science of complexity, which is now going
through a season of deserved popularity. The use of complex
systems’ methods, models and techniques to economic systems
goes back to the nineties (for a rather informative introduction,
see Mantegna and Stanley, 2000), and the welcome received by
mechanical statistics in the field of economics and finance was
such as to encourage its wider application to the rest of the social
sciences. The popularity of sociophysics grew even more under
the influence of success stories, especially concerning the domain
of pedestrians’ crowd (Helbing et al., 2000) and that of epidemics
(Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001). In the last few years, a
diffuse uncertainty related to globalization, international and cul-
tural conflicts, and the recent financial crisis, led to the necessity
to anticipate and manage critical events on the front-stage. Not
only stakeholders and policy makers but also, and consequently,
research and development funding agencies and evaluators laid
emphasis on science as a system of warning, a source of antic-
ipatory information on the performance of aggregate systems,
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simultaneously triggering and guiding the action of politicians,
administrators, and businessmen. But science is more than antic-
ipation. It is first of all explanation. Accurate prediction can do
without explaining, especially if it is based on large datasets and
sophisticated techniques for extracting knowledge out of them.
Science cannot. Of course, explanation may be allowed by sta-
tistical analysis. For example, topological properties of complex
networks are found among the main factors affecting epidemic
dynamics (for a review, see Yang et al., 2007). But this is not always
the case. Indeed, this is not the paradigmatic case in those social
phenomena in which behavior can be assumed to be irrelevant,
or non-influential.
Behavior is irrelevant or non-influential in social dynamics
where the implications of the phenomenon in question are social,
but its nature is not. To go back to epidemics, the nature of epi-
demics is biological. The level of reality involved entities belong
to does not matter for the observed phenomenon to take place:
the nature of entities involved in and target of epidemics matters
not. In the spread of epidemics, the difference between human
behavior and that of particles in the space does not matter,
nor does the difference from carriers and the viruses they carry
around. But in other cases, that is, when the nature of behav-
ior matters, accurate statistical analyses of social dynamics can
maybe reach predictive power but cannot fully explain what is
going on.
As a hypothetical example, suppose we want to know what are
the main factors responsible for the dynamics of opinions. Again,
current models (Deffuant et al., 2001; Galam, 2002; Hegselmann
and Krause, 2002; Castellano et al., 2009), find that the struc-
ture of the network of communication affects opinion dynamics.
Of course, the source of information also matters; a contrast-
ing source may inhibit the effect of media broadcasting and the
process is non-linear: under a given critical level of coverage,
the broadcasting message may be inhibited by a “contrarian”
opinion spread through word of mouth. Analogously, below a
critical level of confidence “contrarian” opinions may reach all
agents (Castellano et al., 2009). Social dynamics are often non-
linear and typically smolder at some length under the ashes and
only subsequently surface in convergent opinions or behaviors.
Suppose one predicts the moment(s) at which this will hap-
pen in real-world dynamics thanks to statistical analysis and
physical models. The question is why it happens. Of course behav-
ior is irrelevant to predict when convergence will occur. But it
matters if, for example, we want to affect the process, by short-
ening or delaying it, or even prevent it; to educate people to a
higher autonomy; to favor info-diversity; finally, to convert opin-
ions in something more solid and resistant, like knowledge, and
so on.
People withdrawing support from political leaders is a good
example of non-linear opinion dynamics. It is unclear when peo-
ple change their minds and turn down their leaders. The destiny
of a popular (and often populist) figure is often decided upon in
a very short time. Today, those who enjoyed the favor of their fol-
lowers until yesterday, may suddenly lose popularity and fall in
disgrace, what is again a matter of threshold: after a certain level
of spreading, and perceived spreading, agents are led to mod-
ify their opinions, what probably reveals an interesting effect of
shared representations about shared opinions on one’s confidence
level. Possibly, such a lowering confidence leads agents to be more
eager to change opinions.
However, the circuit may be completely different: agents may
resist pressure to change opinions despite contrasting evidence
for reasons of cognitive dissonance. The more the contrast-
ing evidence they gather, the higher the dissonance. To reduce
it, they try to ignore evidence that is less costly than change
opinion, which imply dropping the previous commitment and
making a new one. As the perceived distance from others’ opin-
ions increases, however, agents either hide their opinions or
must defend them openly. If they choose the latter strategy, they
may even end up by accepting to form part of a minority. If
they take the former option they cannot get along with decep-
tion too long as cognitive dissonance increases. Consequently,
they accept others’ opinions as own, and are likelier to con-
vert them in open behaviors to convince others and them-
selves about the solidity of their new opinions. Both routes
imply critical thresholds for totally different reasons. To act effi-
caciously on this process, we must be clear what is actually
going on. Confidence has different implications from cogni-
tive dissonance and self-deception. To increase confidence may
lead to higher stability in the former case, but not in the
latter.
To sum up, to model social dynamics without taking into
account the internal (cognitive) dynamics of the entities involved
in a social phenomenon does not prevent accurate predictions
of critical events and changes. It may even allow to find out fac-
tors responsible for such events and changes, and this is the case
with dynamics for which the social nature of behavior is irrele-
vant. To understand internal dynamics is crucial instead whenever
we need not only to anticipate but also to understand events for
which behavior is relevant. Model the internal dynamics of events
is necessary not only for scientific reasons but also for guiding
intervention.
4. TOWARD A NEW INTERDISCIPLINARY FOUNDATION FOR
CSS
The program for CSS needs clarification. Why would such a
program be necessary, if we practice CSS since at least a cou-
ple of decades? Of course one might say that we need to
introduce a new Curriculum at the academic level, and that
to do this implies to form a new, cohesive, scientific commu-
nity, form associations, give visibility to this new Curriculum,
strengthen the academic, editorial, and political power of the
underlying community etc. However, the reason for a pro-
gram on CSS is not only political but also scientific. As
seen so far, there are different variants of CSS and to take
a pluralistic approach to it may be considered wise. CSS
could be seen today as a larger umbrella under which dif-
ferent approaches might coexist and somehow feel legitimate.
Hence, generative ABM might be practiced by a subset of
social scientists, while others might prefer a purely quantita-
tive approach, based on data-mining and numerical simulation,
and still others might continue to formulate abstract theories of
social action in elegant equations and deduce their macro-level
consequences.
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The main thesis of this paper is that such a multidisciplinary
program for CSS would be another lost occasion for science. It
would but result either in tight but essentially useless theories,
or in accurate predictions of poorly understood social phenom-
ena. In the best possible case, mathematicians will go on citing
one another in fairly close circuits of beautiful minds, physicists
will find new phenomena affected by the properties of scale-free
networks, and social scientists will give up generative ABM in
the desperate attempt to produce competitive quantitative social
science and get reasonably high scientific scores.
An interesting, innovative program in CSS can only be inter-
disciplinary. Why and where is the difference? The reason lies
in the necessity to take advantage from the different mod-
eling methods and techniques to both understand and pre-
dict the same phenomena! The difference of interdisciplinary
from multidisciplinary CSS consists not only of a convergent
investigation of the same phenomena from different perspec-
tives and involving different competencies, what would already
be a step ahead with regard to current practice, but in a
more radical process aimed at multilevel and modular mod-
eling. Such a type of modeling would allow to describe the
dynamics of given phenomena at aggregate levels based on large
datasets, find out the criticalities thanks to complex dynamic
systems models, make hypotheses about the behavioral dynam-
ics when this is relevant, use ABM to check internal consis-
tency and observe the resulting states at the aggregate level,
apply cross-methodological experimental methods to validate
the hypotheses against real-world data, update data-mining
methods, models, and probability distribution models to newly
acquired knowledge, and use mathematical equations when pos-
sible to close the number of states resulting at the aggregate
level.
An interdisciplinary endeavor like this certainly points out
some new challenges: not only to extract knowledge from larger
and larger datasets, not only develop simulators that scale up
of several orders of magnitude, or feed simulation and data-
mining with online real-data, not only to develop supercom-
puting infrastructures and systems to transfer data to super-
computing platforms, but also develop simulation platforms
that scale up both in terms of systems’ dimensions and in
terms of levels of complexity. We need to account for large-
scale systems as well as more complex entities. We need to
apply simulation methods to understand the social and the men-
tal dynamics and to describe their interrelationships. Last, but
not least, we need incentives that are compatible with such an
endeavor—publication-wise and career-wise. This is a challenge
for a program on CSS that deserves attention and investment.
CSS ought to accept it, or another occasion will be lost for
founding a novel, integrated, interdisciplinary, falsifiable science
of society helping us to solve transformative and foundational
problems.
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